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EXHIBITS LIST

No hearing was held, and no exhibits were offered or admitted. The decision was based upon a
stipulation of facts.

EXHIBITS LIST - i

SEND ORIGINAL TO: INDUST

, 83720, BOISE, IDAHO 83720-0041

, COMMISSION, JUDICIAL DIVISION, P.O.

WORKERS' COMPENSATION
COMPLAINT I.C. No.13-024694
CLAIMANT'S (INJURED WORKER) NAME AND ADDRESS

CLAIMANT'S ATTORNEY'S NA!vlE, ADDRESS, AND TELEPHONE NUMBER

BARBARA KELLY
1224
Street Sp I
Clarkston, "'
99403

Michael Kessinger
GOICOECHEA LAW OFFICES, LLP
PO Box 287
Lewiston, ID 83501

TELEPHONE NUMBER: (208) 816-9582
Telephone Number: 208. 743.2313
EMPLOYER'S NAtviE AND ADDRESS (at

WORKERS' COMPENSATION INSURANCE CARRIER'S
(NOT ADJUSTOR'S) NAME AND ADDRESS

time of iajury)

BLUE RIBBON LINEN SUPPLY, INC.
PO Box 798
Lewiston, Idaho 8350 I

CLAIMANT'S SOCIAL SECURITY NO.

IDAHO STATE INSURANCE FUND
PO Box83720
Boise, Idaho 83720-0044

CLAIMANT'S BIRTHDATE

DATE OF INJURY OR MANIFESTATION OF OCCUPATIONAL DISEASE
September I 6, 2013

STATE AND COUNTY IN WHICH INJURY OCCURRED

WHEN INJURED, CLAIMANT WAS EARNING AN AVERAGE WEEKLY WAGE

State of Idaho, County of Nez Perce

OF: $ _369.60

, PURSUANT TO IDAHO CODE§ 72-419

DESCRIBE HOW INJURY OR OCCUPATIONAL DISEASE OCCURRED (WHAT HAPPENED)
Claimant's left foot was ran over by a cart. When returning from a surety mandated medical evaluation for her left foot, Claimant was involved in a head-on collision. Both of Claimant's legs were
broken.

NATURE OF MEDICAL PROBLEMS ALLEGED AS A RESULT OF ACCIDENT OR OCCUPATIONAL DISEASE
Claimant suffered a broken left foot in her initial industrial injury. In the crash returning from the medical evaluation, both of Claimant's legs were broken.

WHAT WORKERS' COMPENSATION BENEFITS ARE YOU CLAIMING AT TIDS TIME?
See issues below.
DATE ON WHICH NOTICE OF INJURY WAS GIVEN TO EMPLOYER

TO WHOM NOTICE WAS GIVEN

Se tember 16, 2013
HOW NOTICE WAS GIVEN:

lliJ

ORAL

D

0

WRITTEN

OTHER, PLEASE SPECIFY

ISSUE OR ISSUES INVOLVED
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

Entitlement to medical care;
Entitlement to temporary total disability;
Entitlement to permanent partial impairment;
Entitlement to disability in excess of impainnent;
Entitlement to retraining;
Entitlement to attorney fees for an unreasonable denial of benefits.

DO YOU BELIEVE TIDS CLAIM PRESENTS A NEW QUESTION OF LAW OR A COMPLICATED SET OF FACTS?

lliJ

YES

O

NO. IF SO, PL_E;.f\SE STATE WHY.

Claimant was returning from a surety mandated medical evaluation over I 00 miles from her home when she was involved in a car crash. Claimant was not at fault fQr the crash. It is Claimant's
position that under the compensable consequences doctrine the surety is responsible for the damages Claimant has incurred as a result of the crash. -- ·
' "";

NOTICE: COMPLAINTS AGAINST THE INDUSTRIAL SPECIAL INDEMNITY FUND MUST BE IN ACCORDANCE WITH
IDAHO CODE § 72-334 AND FILED ON FORM I.C. 1002
ICIOOl

(COMPLETE OTHER SIDE)

Complaint - Page 1 of 3

PHYSICIANS WHO TREATED CLAJMANT (NAME AND. .· 0RESS)
Tri-State Memorial Hospital; PO Box 189; Clarkston, Washington 99403
Lewiston Orthopaedic Associates; 320 Warner Drive; Lewiston, Idaho 83501
Sport Physical Therapy; 328 Warner Drive; Lewiston, Idaho 83501
Interventional Pain Consultants; 2841 Juniper Drive; Lewiston, Idaho 83501
Robert Freidman MD; PO Box 1128; Boise, Idaho 83701
Moscow Ambulance; 603 S Main Street; Moscow, Idaho 83843
Gritman Medical Center; 700 S Main Street; Moscow, Idaho 83843
Sacred Heart Medical Center; IO I W 8111 Avenue; Spokane, Washington 9920 I
Northwest MedStar; PO Box ll005; Spokane Valley, Washington 99211
Prestige Care; 1014 Burrell Avenue; Lewiston, Idaho 83501

WHAT MEDICAL COSTS HAVE YOU INCURRED TO DATE?
To be ascertained

WHAT MEDICAL COSTS HAS YOUR EMPLOYER PAID, IF ANY? $ Unknown

WHAT MEDICAL COSTS HAVE YOU PAID, IF ANY?$_ Unknown

[8] YES

I AM INTERESTED IN MEDIATING THIS CLAIM, IF THE OTHER PARTIES AGREE.
DATE

SIGNATURE

---~1

D

NO

CLAJMAJ;JT OR ATTORt"'!EY

(11)l1Lf
I

'

!

PLEASE ANSWER THE SET OF QUESTIONS IMMEDIATELY BELOW
ONLY IF CLAIM IS MADE FOR DEATH BENEFITS
NAME AND SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER OF PARTY
FILING COMPLAINT

WAS FILING PARTY DEPENDENT ON DECEASED?

I

ONO

DYES

RELATION TO DECEASED CLAIMANT

DATE OF DEATH

DID FILING PARTY LIVE WITH DECEASED AT TIME OF ACCIDENT?
DYES

DNo

CLAIMANT MUST COMPLETE, SIGN AND DATE THE ATTACHED MEDICAL RELEASE FORM
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on the

day of January, 2014, I caused to be served a true and correct copy of the foregoing Complaint upon:

EMPLOYER'S NAME AND ADDRESS

SURETY'S NAME AND ADDRESS

Blue Ribbon Linen Supply, Inc.
PO Box 798
Lewiston, Idaho 83501

Idaho State Insurance Fund
PO Box83720
Boise, Idaho 83720-0044

via:

personal service of process

via:

x regular U.S. Mail-Certified

personal service of process
--------------

------

regular U.S. Mai{-Certified

NOTICE: An Employer or Insurance Company served with a Complaint must file an Answer on Form J.C. 1003 with
the Industrial Commission within 21 days of the date of service as specified on the certificate of mailing to avoid
default. If no answer is filed, a Default Award may be entered!
Further information may be obtained from: Industrial Commission, Judicial Division, P.O. Box 83720, Boise, Idaho
83720-0041 (208) 334-6000.

(COMPLETE MEDICAL RELEASE FORJW ON PAGE 3)

INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION
PO BOX 83720
BOISE ID 83720-0041

"""'._.,,,~-"-'--r-------

Patient Na
Birth Date:
Address: i.=.=--:...<...t:!..J.<O.
Phone Number: 2D
SSN or Case Number:

"-L-L""'-'----------

"--_ __

(Provider Use Only)
Medical Record Number: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
o Pick up Copies
o Fax Copies # _ _
o Mail Copies
ID Confirmed by:

AUTHORIZATION FOR DISCLOSURE OF HEALTH INFORMATION
I hereby authorize _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ to disclose health information as specified:
Provider Name - must be specific for each provider

To:------------------------------------Insurance Company/Third Party Administrator/ Self Insured Employerl/SIF, their attorneys or patient's attorney

Street Address
City

Zip Code

State

Purpose or need for d a t a : - - - = - - - , - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - (E.g. Worker's Compensation Claim)

Information to be disclosed:

D
D
D
D
D
D

Date(s) of Hospitalization/Care: _ _ _ _ _ __

Discharge Summary
Pathology
D
History & Physical Exam
Radiology Reports
D
Consultation Reports
Radiology Films
D
Operative Reports
Entire Record
D
Lab
Other: Specify _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

I understand that the disclosure may include information relating to (check if applicable).
D
D
D

AIDS or HIV
Psychiatric or Mental Health Information
Drug/Alcohol Abuse Information

I understand that the information to be released may include material that is protected by Federal Law (45 CFR Part 164) and
that the information may be subject to redisclosure by the recipient and no longer be protected by the federal regulations. I
understand that this authorization may be revoked in writing at any time by notifying the privacy officer, except that revoking
the authorization won't apply to information already released in response to this authorization. I understand that the provider
will not condition treatment, payment, enrollment, or eligibility for benefits on my signing this authorization. Unless otherwise
revoked, this authorization will expire upon resolution of worker's compensation claim. Provider, its employees,
officers, copy service contractor, and physicians are hereby released from any legal responsibility or liability for disclosure of
the above information to the extent indicated and authorized by me on this form and as outlined in the Notice of Privacy. My
signature below authorizes release of all information specified in this authorization. Any questions that I have regarding
disclosure may be directed to the privacy officer of the Provider specified above.

Signature of Legal Representative & Relationship to Patient/Authority to Act

Date

Signature of Witness

Date

Original: Medical Record

Copy: Patient

Complaint - Page "
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BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

BARBARA KELLY,
Claimant,

IC 2013-024694
ORDER ON REQUEST FOR
EMERGENCY HEARING

V.

BLUE RIBBON LINEN SUPPLY, INC.,
Employer,
and
STATE INSURANCE FUND,
Surety,
Defendants.

On February 10, 2014, Claimant filed a Request for Emergency Hearing. Pursuant
to the telephone conference conducted by Referee Michael E. Powers with the parties on
February 19, 2014, and for good cause shown,
The Industrial Commission of the State of Idaho hereby ORDERS that in lieu of a
hearing, the parties have agreed to file a Stipulation of Facts on the issue of whether
Claimant's automobile accident was a compensable consequence of her workers'
compensation claim.
A briefing schedule will be issued once the Stipulation of Facts has been filed with
the Commission.
DATED this~+.h day of February, 2014.
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION

~~~
Michael E. Powers, Referee

ORDER ON REQUEST FOR EMERGENCY HEARING - 1

ATTEST:

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

+.h-

I hereby certify that on the JO day of February, 2014, a true and correct copy of the
ORDER ON REQUEST FOR EMERGENCY HEARING was served by United States
Certified Mail upon each of the following:
MICHAEL T KESSINGER
PO BOX 287
LEWISTON ID 83501
WYNN MOSMAN
PO BOX 8456
MOSCOW ID 83843-8456

ge

ORDER ON REQUEST FOR EMERGENCY HEARING - 2

SEND ORIGINAL TO: INDUSTRIAL CO

SION, JUDICIAL DIVISION, P.O. BOX 8372

nlSE, IDAHO 83720-0041

ANSWER TO COMPLAINT
INJURY DATE September 16, 2013

1.C. NO. 13-024694

(xJ The above-named employer or employer/surety responds to Claimant's Complaint by stating:

0

The Industrial Special Indemnity Fund responds to the Complaint against the ISIF by stating:

CLAIMANT'S NAME AND ADDRESS

CLAIMANT'S ATTORNEY'S NAME AND ADDRESS
Michael Kessinger
Attorney at Law
PO Box 287
Lewiston, ID 83501

Barbara Kelly
c/o Michael Kessinger
PO Box 287
Lewiston, ID 83501

WORKERS' COMPENSATION INSURANCE CARRIER'S
(NOT ADJUSTOR'S) NAME AND ADDRESS

EMPLOYER'S NAME AND ADDRESS
Blue Ribbon Linen Supply, Inc.
PO Box 798
Lewiston, ID 83501

IDAHO STATE INSURANCE FUND
PO BOX83720
BOISE, ID 83720

TELEPHONE NUMBER:

ATTORNEY REPRESENTING EMPLOYER OR EMPLOYER/SURETY (NAME AND
ADDRESS)

ATTORNEY REPRESENTING INDUSTRIAL SPECIAL INDEMNITY FUND (NAME
AND ADDRESS)

WYNN MOSMAN
MOSMAN LAW OFFICES
PO BOX 8456
MOSCOW, ID 83843

·.·

IT IS: (Check One)
Denied

Admitted
[gf

0

1. That the accident or occupational exposure alleged in the Complaint actually occurred on or
about the time claimed.

t8J
t8J
0

D
D

2. That the employer/employee relationship existed.

fg]

4. That the condition for which benefits are claimed was caused
entirely by an accident arising out of and in the course of Claimant's employment.

0

D

NIA

N/A

5. That, if an occupational disease is alleged, manifestation of such disease is or was due to the
nature of the employment in which the hazards of such disease actually exist, are characteristic of
and peculiar to the trade, occupation, process, or employment.

t8J

D

6. That notice of the accident causing the injury, or notice of the occupational disease, was given
to the employer as soon as practical but not later than 60 days after such accident or 60 days of the
manifestation of such occupational disease.

t8J

D

7. That the rate of wages claimed is correct. If denied, state the average weekly wage pursuant to
Idaho Code, § 72-419: $ .

t8J

D

8. That the alleged employer was insured or permissibly self-insured under the Idaho Workers'
Compensation Act.

3. That the parties were subject to the provisions of the Idaho Workers' Compensation Act.

9. What benefits, if any, do you concede are due Claimant?

None beyond additional care recommended by Dr. Friedman, the IME physician.

IC1003 (Rev. 1/01/2004)

(COMPLETE OTHER SIDE)
Appendix 3

Answer-Page 1 of 2

Continued from front
10. State with specificity what matters a

", dispute and your reason for denying liability, t

<:,[her with any affirmative defenses.

Entitlement to medical care; temporary total disability; permanent partial impairment; disability in excess of impairment; retraining

and attorney fees.

Under the Commission rules, you have 21 days from the date of service of the Complaint to answer the Complaint. A copy of
your Answer must be mailed to the Commission and a copy must be served on all parties or their attorneys by regular U.S. mail
or by personal service of process. Unless you deny liability, you should pay immediately the compensation required by law, and
not cause the claimant, as well as yourself, the expense of a hearing. All compensation which is concededly due and accrued
should be paid. Payments due should not be withheld because a Complaint has been filed. Rule 3.D., Judicial Rules of Practice
and Procedure under the Idaho Workers' Compensation Law, applies. Complaints against the Industrial Special Indemnity Fund
must be filed on Form I.C. 1002.
I AM INTERESTED IN MEDIATING THIS CLAIM, IF THE OTHER PARTIES AGREE.

~YES

0No

DO YOU BELIEVE THIS CLAIM PRESENTS A NEW QUESTION OF LAW ORA COMPLICATED SET OF FACTS? IF SO, PLEASE STATE.

Yes. Defendants deny that injuries resulting from the motor vehicle accident are a compensable consequence of the industrial injury.

tri:J''"'
2 -) /-/3/

Amount of Compensation Paid to Date

Dated

PPI/PPD

TTD

Medical

$0.00

$4,989.21

$9,880.85

PLEASE COMPLETE
I hereby certify that on the

1

I

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

J.-,f

o, AtOOmey

f

day of February, 2014, I caused to be served a true and correct copy of the foregoing Answer upon:

CLAIMANT'S NAME AND ADDRESS

EMPLOYER AND SURETY'S
NAME AND ADDRESS

INDUSTRIAL SPECIAL INDEMNITY FUND
(if applicable)

Barbara Kelly
c/o Michael Kessinger
PO Box 287
Lewiston, ID 83501

via:

D
r2J

personal service of process
regular U.S. Mail

via:

D personal service of process
D regular U.S. Mail

via:

D personal service of process
D regular U.S. Mail
Answer-Page 2 of 2

Goi

Mar. 24. 2014 3:40PM

echea law Off ices Lewiston

No. 8212

P. 2

Michael T. Kessinger, Esq.~ ISBA No. 6719
GOICOECHEA LAW OFFICES, LLP
826 Main Street
PO Box 287
Lewiston, Idaho 83501
Telephone: (208) 743-2313

Facsimile: (208) 743-8140

Attorneys for the Claimant
BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

BARBARA KELLY,
IC No.: 13-024694
Claimant,

STIPULATION OF FACTS

V.

BLUE RfBBON LINEN SUPPLY, INC.,
Employer,
and
IDAHO STATE INSURANCE FUND,
Surety,
Defendants.
COME NOW the above-entitled parties by and through their respective attorneys
of record, and in accordance with the Industrial Commission's Order On Request For
Emergency Hearing, hereby stipulate to the following facts on the issue of whether
Claimant's automobile accident was a compensable consequence of her workers'
compensation claim:
1. On September 16, 2013, Claimant Barbara Kelly (hereafter Claimant) was an
employee of Blue Ribbon Linen Supply, Inc. (hereafter Blue Ribbon), ln Lewiston,
Idaho, At said time, Blue Ribbon was insured for its obligations under the Idaho
STIPULATION OF FACTS

1

1-1 .( •

Michael T. Kessinger, Esq. - !SBA No. 6719
GOICOECHEA LAW OFFICES, LLP
826 Main Street
PO Box 287
Lewiston, Idaho 83501
Telephone: (208) 743-2313
Facsimile: (208) 743-8140
Attorneys for the Claimant

BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

BARBARA KELLY,
IC No.: 13-024694
Claimant,
STIPULATION OF FACTS

V.

BLUE RIBBON LINEN SUPPLY, INC.,
Employer,
and
IDAHO STATE INSURANCE FUND,
Surety,
Defendants.
COME NOW the above-entitled parties by and through their respective attorneys
of record, and in accordance with the Industrial Commission's Order On Request For
Emergency Hearing, hereby stipulate to the following facts on the issue of whether
Claimant's automobile accident was a compensable consequence of her workers'
compensation claim:
1. On September 16, 2013, Claimant Barbara Kelly (hereafter Claimant) was an
employee of Blue Ribbon Linen Supply, Inc. (hereafter Blue Ribbon), in Lewiston,
Idaho. At said time, Blue Ribbon was insured for its obligations under the Idaho
STIPULATION OF FACTS

Workers' Compensation Act by the Idaho State Insurance Fund (hereafter
Surety).
2. On or about September 16, 2013, Claimant, Employer, and Surety were subject
to the provisions of Idaho's Worker's Compensation Law.
3. Claimant suffered a compensable workers' compensation injury when a cart
rolled over her left foot while in the course and scope of her employment with
Blue Ribbon on September 16, 2013.
4. Surety paid medical and time loss benefits to Claimant as a result of the injury to
her left foot.
5. On or about November 8, 2013, Julie Estes, an agent of Surety, sent Claimant a
letter, which read as follows:
We [Surety] have arranged for you to be seen in an independent medical
evaluation with Robert Friedman. This appointment is scheduled for
November 15, 2013, at 1:00 p.m. and will be held at Kootenai Health
Plaza, which is located at 1300 East Mullan Avenue, Post Falls, Idaho.
Please make the necessary arrangements to keep this appointment and
bring copies of all x-rays/MRI films with you. Failure to do so may
result in the termination of benefits and the responsibility for any "no
show" charges.
You may submit a report of all travel expenses to this office for
reimbursement. This should include the date traveled, destination, and
round trip mileage.
6. It is approximately 125 miles each way from Claimant's workplace in Lewiston,
Idaho, to Post Falls, Idaho.
7. Dr. Robert Friedman performs medical evaluations in Lewiston, Idaho.
Appointments with Dr. Friedman were available in November in Post Falls and in

STIPULATION OF FACTS

2

December in Lewiston. Claimant was scheduled for the November appointment
in Post Falls.
8. On November 15, 2013, Claimant traveled to Post Falls, Idaho, for the suretyscheduled medical evaluation. On said date she was still an employee of Blue
Ribbon and was receiving time loss benefits from Surety.
9.

Directly after meeting with Dr. Friedman, Claimant began her return trip from
Post Falls, Idaho, to Lewiston.

10. Claimant did not make any stops or take any detours on her way home from the
appointment with Dr. Friedman.
11. At 3:50 p.m. on November 15, 2013, on US 95 approximately five miles south of
Potlatch, it was snowing, and the road was covered with snow. At said locatior:i,
Claimant was southbound in her Ford Expedition when a northbound Ford F150
lost traction, crossed the centerline, and collided head-on with Claimant's vehicle.
Claimant's actions did not cause or contribute to the collision.
12. As a result of the automobile collision, Claimant suffered severe physical injuries
to her lower extremities. Due to the extent of her injuries, Claimant's doctor
restricted her from any weight-bearing on her lower extremities until further
notice. As a result of the crash, Claimant was in a skilled nursing facility in
Lewiston, Idaho, until February 28, 2014.

2014.

STIPULATION OF FACTS

3

MICHAEL KESSINGER
Attorney for Claimant

STIPULATION OF FACTS

4

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

true and correct copy of the foregoing Stipulation of Facts via facsimile and US Mail
upon:
Wynn Mosman
PO Box 8456
Moscow, ID 83843
Fax: 208.882.0589

STIPULATION OF FACTS

5

Apr. 1/. 1014 2:11PM

Goicoechea Law Offices Lewiston

No. 8436

P. 2

Michael T. Kessinger, Esq; - ISBA No. 6719
GOICOECHEA LAW OFFICES, LLP
826 Main Street
PO Box 287
Lewiston, Idaho 83501
Telephone: (208) 743-2313
Facsimile: (208) 743-8140
Attorneys for the Claimant
BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

BARBARA KELLY,
IC No.: 13-024694

Claimant,

CLAIMANT'S OPENING BRIEF

V.

BLUE RIBBON LINEN SUPPLY, INC.,
Employer,

and
IDAHO STATE INSURANCE FUND,
Surety,

Defendants.
OPENING STATEMENT

The Idaho Industrial Commission assigned the above-entitled matter to Referee
Michael E. Powers, In lieu of a hearing, the parties submitted a Stipulation of Facts.

tSSUE
Whether the automobile accident of November 15, 2013, was a compensable
consequence of Claimant's September 16, 2013, workers' compensation injury.

CLAIMANT'S OPENING BRIEF

1

Michael T. Kessinger, Esq. - ISBA No. 6719
GOICOECHEA LAW OFFICES, LLP
826 Main Street
PO Box 287
Lewiston, Idaho 83501
Telephone: (208) 743-2313
Facsimile: (208) 743-8140

Attorneys for the Claimant

BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

BARBARA KELLY,
IC No.: 13-024694
Claimant,
CLAIMANT'S OPENING BRIEF

V.

BLUE RIBBON LINEN SUPPLY, INC.,
Employer,
and
IDAHO STATE INSURANCE FUND,
Surety,
Defendants.

OPENING STATEMENT

The Idaho Industrial Commission assigned the above-entitled matter to Referee
Michael E. Powers. In lieu of a hearing, the parties submitted a Stipulation of Facts.
ISSUE

Whether the automobile accident of November 15, 2013, was a compensable
consequence of Claimant's September 16, 2013, workers' compensation injury.

CLAIMANT'S OPENING BRIEF

1

STATEMENT OF FACTS

The parties stipulated to the following facts:
On September 16, 2013, Claimant Barbara Kelly (hereafter Claimant) was an
employee of Blue Ribbon Linen Supply, Inc, (hereafter Blue Ribbon), in Lewiston, Idaho.
At said time, Blue Ribbon was insured for its obligations under the Idaho Workers'
Compensation Act by the Idaho State Insurance Fund (hereafter Surety).
On or about September 16, 2013, Claimant, Employer, and Surety were subject
to the provisions of Idaho's Worker's Compensation Law.
Claimant suffered a compensable workers' compensation injury when a cart
rolled over her left foot while in the course and scope of her employment with Blue
Ribbon on September 16, 2013.
Surety paid medical and time loss benefits to Claimant as a result of the injury to
her left foot.
On or about November 8, 2013, Julie Estes, an agent of Surety, sent Claimant a
letter, which read as follows:
We [Surety] have arranged for you to be seen in an independent medical
evaluation with Robert Friedman. This appointment is scheduled for
November 15, 2013, at 1:00 p.m. and will be held at Kootenai Health
Plaza, which is located at 1300 East Mullan Avenue, Post Falls, Idaho.
Please make the necessary arrangements to keep this appointment and
bring copies of all x-rays/MRI films with you. Failure to do so may
result in the termination of benefits and the responsibility for any "no
show" charges.
You may submit a report of all travel expenses to this office for
reimbursement. This should include the date traveled, destination, and
round trip mileage.

CLAIMANT'S OPENING BRIEF

2

It is approximately 125 miles each way from Claimant's workplace in Lewiston,
Idaho, to Post Falls, Idaho.
Dr. Robert Friedman performs medical evaluations in Lewiston, Idaho.
Appointments with Dr. Friedman were available in November in Post Falls and in
December in Lewiston. Claimant was scheduled for the November appointment in Post
Falls.
On November 15, 2013, Claimant traveled to Post Falls, Idaho, for the suretyscheduled medical evaluation. On said date she was still an employee of Blue Ribbon
and was receiving time loss benefits from Surety.
Directly after meeting with Dr. Friedman, Claimant began her return trip from
Post Falls, Idaho, to Lewiston.
Claimant did not make any stops or take any detours on her way home from the
appointment with Dr. Friedman.
At 3:50 p.m. on November 15, 2013, on US 95 approximately five miles south of
Potlatch, it was snowing, and the road was covered with snow. At said location,
Claimant was southbound in her Ford Expedition when a northbound Ford F150 lost
traction, crossed the centerline, and collided head-on with Claimant's vehicle.
Claimant's actions did not cause or contribute to the collision.
As a result of the automobile collision, Claimant suffered severe physical injuries
to her lower extremities. Due to the extent of her injuries, Claimant's doctor restricted
her from any weight-bearing on her lower extremities until further notice. As a result of
the crash, Claimant was in a skilled nursing facility in Lewiston, Idaho, until February 28,
2014.
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ARGUMENT

The provisions of Idaho Workers' Compensation Law are to be liberally
construed in favor of the injured worker. Haldiman v. American Fine Foods, 117 Idaho
955, 956, 793 P.2d 187 (1990). The humane purposes which it serves leave no room
for narrow, technical construction. Ogden v. Thompson, 128 Idaho 87, 88, 910 P.2d 759
(1996).
1. The Idaho Industrial Commission has adopted the Compensable
Consequences Doctrine set forth in Larson's Workers' Compensation Law.

The Idaho Industrial Commission and the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho have
often looked to Larson's Workers' Compensation Law when deciding Idaho workers'
compensation cases. It is well-established that the Idaho Industrial Commission has
adopted the "compensable consequence" doctrine discussed by Professor Larson, the
leading authority on workers' compensation in the United States. This doctrine provides:
When the primary injury is shown to have arisen out of and in the course of
employment, every natural consequence that flows from the injury likewise arises
out of the employment, unless it is the result of an independent intervening cause
contributable to the claimant's own intentional conduct.
Larson's Workers Compensation Law, ch. 10 (2010).
In accordance with the compensable consequence doctrine, the Industrial
Commission has consistently found that secondary injuries are compensable when they
are a result of a primary compensable injury; for some examples see Lee v. J.R.
Simplot Co., 1996 IIC 0019 (January 1996) (Upper extremity condition developed during
employer approved vocational rehabilitation found to be a compensable consequence of
a work-related back injury); Salvador2003 v. Fremont Compensation, 2003 IIC 0258
(April 2003) (Right shoulder injury caused by the LifeFit program during treatment for a
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low back injury held to be a compensable natural consequence of the original back
injury); Nelson v. First Interstate Bank and Transportation Ins. Co., 2000 IIC 0914
(October 2000) (Left shoulder injury found to be a compensable consequence of the
original right shoulder injury).
Quasi-course of employment and implied employment contract are two legal
theories that are central to the compensable consequence doctrine as it applies to
injuries sustained while traveling to and from a medical evaluation.
a. Quasi-Course of Employment
At the very foundation of the compensable consequence doctrine is a deviation
from the standard "course and scope" of employment requirements that generally
govern the compensability of an industrial injury:
Since, in the strict sense, none of the consequential injuries we are concerned
with are in the course of employment, it becomes necessary to contrive a new
concept, which we may for convenience call "quasi-course of employment." By
this expression is meant activities undertaken by the employee following upon his
or her injury which, although they take place outside the time and space limits of
the employment, and would not be considered employment activities for usual
purposes, are nevertheless related to the employment in the sense that they are
necessary or reasonable activities that would not have been undertaken but for
the compensable injury.
Larson's, § 10.05 (2010).
Professor Larson's example of quasi-course activity is on point:
When the injury following the initial compensable injury arises out of a quasicourse activity, such as a trip to the doctor's office, the chain of causation should
not be deemed broken by mere negligence in the performance of the activity, but
only by intentional conduct which may be regarded as expressly or impliedly
prohibited by the employer.
Larson's,§ 10.05 (2010) (emphasis added).
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The Idaho Industrial Commission has adopted a position very close to quasicourse activity outlined by Professor Larson. Discussing the compensable consequence
doctrine, the Commission held:
The application of this rule is almost entirely limited to situations where a primary
work-related injury is followed by a later nonwork-related injury. The rule is
remedial in nature; its purpose, under such circumstances, is to assure the
worker is compensated for the later, nonwork-related injury by providing that
such an injury "likewise arises out of employment."
Keith v. Connors Logging, Inc., 1990 IIC 0660 (September 1990).
b. Implied Employment Contract
Many jurisdictions have held the correlative duties imposed on employers and
injured workers become by implication part of the employment contract. Professor
Larson, discussing the Kansas case, Taylor v. Centex Constr. Co., 191 Kan. 130, 379
P.2d 217 (1963), wrote that the arguments put forth by the Kansas Court for
compensability in this setting "are difficult to answer":
The court noted that the employer is under a statutory duty to furnish medical
care, and that the employee is similarly under a duty to submit to reasonable
medical treatment under the act. The provisions of the act, in turn, become by
implication part of the employment contract. This being so, the better view
appears to be that accidental injuries during a trip made pursuant to this statutory
and contractual obligation are work connected.
Larson's,§ 10.07 (2010).
California reached similar conclusions in Laines v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd.,
48 Cal.App.3d 872 (1975), and Durham Transportation Co. v. Workers' Comp. Appeals
Bd., 68 Cal.Comp.Cases 469 (2003). The California Court of Appeals and the Workers'
Compensation Appeals Board both held that injuries sustained in a motor vehicle
collision while traveling to or from a medical facility necessitated by a compensable
industrial injury are compensable consequences of the industrial injury. In arriving at its
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conclusion, the Court reasoned the Code was to be liberally construed with the purpose
of extending benefits and that the injured worker was required to submit to examination
and treatment as a condition of receiving compensation.
Similar to Kansas and California, I.C. § 72-433 allows employers to require
claimant's submission to a medical examination: "employee, if requested by the
employer ... , shall submit himself for examination at reasonable times and places to a
duly qualified physician or surgeon." The employer is responsible to pay for the medical
evaluation and the injured worker's travel expenses. A correlative duty is imposed on
the injured worker: she must attend the medical evaluation scheduled by the employer.
In the case before the Commission, if Claimant did not attend the medical examination
scheduled by Surety, she ran the risk of having her benefits terminated. Ongoing
approval of her workers' compensation benefits were contingent on her traveling to
Defendants' chosen doctor at a time and place beyond Claimant's control.

2. Claimant's automobile accident was a compensable consequence of her
workers' compensation claim.
The parties agree that Claimant suffered a compensable workers' compensation
injury on September 16, 2013, to her foot. The parties also agree that, pursuant to I .C. §
72-433, Defendant Surety scheduled Claimant for an independent medical evaluation
as a result of her September 16, 2013, injury. The Surety-mandated examination
required Claimant to drive from Lewiston to Post Falls. But for the original injury on
September 16, Claimant would not have been at the scene of the crash on November
15, 2013.
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The Commission has routinely inserted the facts of a specific case into Professor
Larson's definition of the compensable consequence doctrine. In this case, it would read
as follows:
When the primary injury [Claimant's foot injury of September 16, 2013] is shown
to have arisen out of and in the course of employment, every natural
consequence that flows from the injury [the medical evaluation and ensuing car
accident] likewise arises out of the employment, unless it is the result of an
independent intervening cause contributable to the claimant's own intentional
conduct.
Claimant's own intentional conduct did not contribute to the crash.
Claimant's injuries sustained in the car accident fall squarely within the purview of
the compensable consequence doctrine. Claimant was involved in a quasi-course
activity as she traveled home from the surety-mandated medical evaluation. Claimant's
travel on November 15, 2013, to and from Post Falls would not have been undertaken
but for her compensable injury of September 16, 2013. Defendant Surety's and
Claimant's duties under Idaho's Workers' Compensation Act became by implication part
of the employment contract. Thus, the car accident is a compensable natural
consequence flowing from the primary injury.

3. Kiger is distinguishable from the case presently before the Commission
and is inconsistent with the current state of Idaho's workers' compensation
law.
In 1963 the Idaho Supreme Court decided the case of Kiger v. The Idaho Corp.
and Employers Fire Ins. Co., 85 Idaho 424, 380 P.2d 208 (1963). In Kiger the claimant
was traveling to a routine doctor's appointment for a compensable workers'
compensation injury when she was involved a car accident. Limiting its analysis to
injuries sustained while in the strict "course of employment", the Court found that
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injuries sustained in the automobile accident were not compensable under the workers'
compensation claim.
Unlike the case presently before the Commission, the claimant in Kiger had set
her own doctor's appointment. She decided when and where she would receive her
medical care. What is more, there is no indication in Kiger that the employer/surety was
compensating claimant for her travel. Whereas, in the present case, Surety, not
Claimant, controlled where and when Claimant had to travel. Surety told Claimant to
attend the medical examination 125 miles from home and that "failure to do so may
result in the termination of benefits." Furthermore, Defendants advised Claimant: "You
may submit a report of all travel expenses to this office for reimbursement."
What is more, Kiger was decided in 1963, prior to the comprehensive revision of
Idaho's workers' compensation laws in 1971, and prior to Idaho's adoption of the
compensable consequence doctrine. The Idaho Industrial Commission has utilized the
compensable consequence doctrine since at least 1990 to find claims compensable.
Keith v. Connors Logging, Inc., 1990 IIC 0660 (September 1990). Since 1990, the
Industrial Commission has consistently ruled that claims are compensable under the
compensable consequence doctrine. By its very definition, the compensable
consequence doctrine makes injuries that are not incurred in the strict "course of
employment" compensable. Keith, 1990.
In addition to the Industrial Commission decisions already set forth above, there
are many other compensable consequence cases that are inconsistent with the strict
"course of employment" interpretation set forth in Kiger: Offer v. Clearwater Forest
Industries, 2000 IIC 0956 (October 2000) (Left shoulder injury that developed while
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compensable right shoulder injury was healing was found to be a compensable
consequence of the right shoulder injury); Quentin2003 v. American Interstate Ins. Co.,
2003 IIC 0237 (April 2003) (Left leg DVT, which developed weeks after the
compensable injury, and low back symptoms found to be compensable consequences
of limp caused by the compensable right knee injury); Castaneda v. Idaho Home Health,
Inc., 1999 IIC 0857 (July 1999) (finding a compensable closed fracture of the humeral
neck in the right shoulder prevented claimant from using her shoulder in a normal
fashion during recovery, which resulted in a compensable right elbow injury); and
Benner v. Home Depot, Inc., 2013 IIC 0020 (January 2013) (finding a panic attack and
psychiatric hospitalization in 2007 were compensable consequences of 2005 back
injuries).
The facts in Kiger are clearly distinguishable from the case presently before the
Commission. Moreover, the law as applied in Kiger is inconsistent with the current state
of Idaho's workers' compensation law. Claimant's injuries from the motor vehicle
collision are a compensable consequence of her September 16, 2013, industrial injury.

4. There is persuasive authority from other jurisdictions to support the
compensability of injuries sustained while traveling to or from medical
appointments required or authorized by the employer/surety.
Professor Larson reports that accidents during trips to the doctor's office are
generally compensable:
§ 10.07 Accident During Trip to Doctor's Office
When an employee suffers additional injuries because of an accident in the
course of a journey to a doctor's office occasioned by a compensable injury, the
additional injuries are generally held compensable ...
Larson, 2010.
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The following is a sampling of jurisdictions that have decided cases consistent with
Professor Larson's observation.
In Fenton v. State Accident Ins. Fund, 87 Or.App. 78, 741 P.2d 517, review
denied, 304 Or. 311, 744 P32d 1295 (1987), the Oregon Court of Appeals concluded
that, "when a worker is injured in an accident which occurs during a trip to see a
physician for treatment of a compensable injury, the new injury is also compensable."
In Iris Vandorn, BIIA Dec., 02 11466 (2003), the Washington Board of Industrial
Insurance Appeals found that the injuries sustained in a motor vehicle collision on a
return trip from a vocational appointment, made at the direction of the Department of
Labor and Industries, were compensable. The Board cited Larson's Workers
Compensation Law with respect to travel to and from medical appointments in allowing
the injuries sustained in the collision as a compensable consequence of the previously
compensable injury.
In addition to the states that have already been addressed, the following
jurisdictions have held that injured workers who are injured traveling to or from medical
examinations or treatment required by or authorized by the surety/employer are covered
by workers' compensation under the previously compensable injury: Arizona in Joplin v.
Industrial Comm'n, 175 Ariz 524, 858 P.2d 669 (Ariz.App. Div. 1 1993); Colorado in
Excel Corp. v. Industrial Claim Appeals Office, 860 P.2d 1393 (Colo.App. 1993);
Nebraska in Straub v. City of Scottsbluff, 280 Neb. 163, 784 N.W.2d 886 (201 O);
Georgia in Firestone Tire and Rubber Co. v. Crawford, 177 Ga. App. 242, 339 S.E.2d
292 (1985); Minnesota in Pedersen v. Maple Island Inc., 256 Minn. 21, 97 N.W.2d 285
(1959); Mississippi in Charles N. Clark Associates, Ltd. v. Dependents of Robinson, 357
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So.2d 924 (1978, Miss); New Jersey in Camp v. Lockheed Electronics, Inc., 178 N.J.
Super. 535,429 A.2d 615, cert. den. 87 N.J. 415, 434 A.2d 1090 (1981); New York in
Consolazio v. Merchants Mutual Ins., 709 N.Y.S.D.2d 191 (A.O. 2 Dept. 2000);
Maryland in Harris v. Mackin & Associates, 100 Md.App. 363, 641 A.2d 938 (Md.App.
1994); Pennsylvania in Berra v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd. (Terminix Intern.
Inc.), 165 Pa.Cmwlth. 298, 645 A.2d 342 (1994); and Virginia in lmmer & Co. v.
Brosnahan, 207 Va. 720, 152 S.E.2d 254 (1967).
Consistent with the general consensus of jurisdictions and with Idaho's prior
adoption of the compensable consequence doctrine, Claimant's motor vehicle collision
was a compensable consequence of her September 16, 2013, work injury.

CONCLUSION
Defendant Surety chose the doctor and exercised control of the time and place of
the medical evaluation in Post Falls. Short of jeopardizing her workers' compensation
benefits, Claimant had no choice but to attend the appointment 125 miles from her
home.
The Industrial Commission must decide between requiring the Employer/Surety
to bear the risk of a Claimant's injury while traveling or requiring the Claimant to bear
the risk of any mishap that may befall her while complying with statutorily required
attendance at a medical examination.
The compensable consequence doctrine has been adopted by the Idaho
Industrial Commission. Consistent with the doctrine, the risk of injury during travel to
and from surety-mandated medical evaluations should be borne by the employer/surety.
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Wherefore, Claimant requests that the Commission find that the injuries she
sustained in the motor vehicle collision of November 15, 2013, were a compensable
consequence of her September 16, 2013, work injury.
DATED this

lr~day of April 2014.
GOICOECHEA LAW OFFICES, LLP

Michael Kessinger
Attorney for Claimant
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BACKGROUND
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Relevant facts are undisputed and are before the Commission by Stipulation. In
short, Claimant was struck head-on while returning from a medical evaluation. Claimant
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was injured in the collision, and required medical care. This is solely dispute over the
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ISSUE

3
4

Whether Claimant is entitled to medical benefits for injuries suffered in an
automobile accident while returning from an independent medical evaluation.

5

ARGUMENT

6

1. Under controlling Idaho precedent, the motor vehicle accident was
"an intervening, independent, responsible, and culminating cause"
and therefore the proximate cause of those injuries

7
8

When presented with similar facts, the Supreme Court of Idaho denied benefits.
9

In Kigerv. The Idaho Corporation, 85 Idaho 424,380 P2d 208 (1963) the claimant was
10

injured in a motor vehicle accident while driving to be seen by her treating doctor. The
11

claimant sought benefits for injuries resulting from the accident, and was denied
12

benefits by the Idaho Accident Board. The claimant appealed.
13

The Supreme Court affirmed the denial, holding that those injuries did not arise
14

out of and in the course of the claimant's employment. Quoting from an earlier Court
15

opinion, the Court stated " ... if there occurs, after the initial accident and injury, an
16

intervening, independent, responsible, and culminating cause, the latter occurrence
17

becomes the proximate cause." Id. at 430 (quoting Under v. City of Payette, 64 Idaho
18

19

656).
It appears that the Supreme Court in Kigerwas presented with similar arguments

20

21

22

as are presented here by claimant- "The Compensation Act should be given a broad,
liberal construction, doubtful cases result in favor of compensation and the main

23
24

25
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3

purpose which the act seeks to serve leaves no room for technical construction." Kiger
at 426. Also see Claimant's Opening Brief, p. 4.

4

5

Those arguments correctly state the law. Nonetheless, the law of Idaho remains
that when there is an intervening, independent, responsible, and culminating cause,

6

benefits must be denied.
7

2. Persuasive Authority
8

Courts of other jurisdictions, following the reasoning of Kiger and Linder, have
9

denied compensation under similar facts. For example, in Wyoming Workers' Safety
10

and Compensation Division v. Bruhn, 951 P2d 372 (Wyo. 1997), the injured employee
11

was killed in a car accident while returning from a medical appointment when her
12

vehicle slid on ice and rolled. As is the case here, the employee:
13

14

•
•
•

15
16

17

•
•

18

•

had previously suffered an undisputed workplace injury;
was awarded benefits for that injury, including medical benefits;
was returning from a medical appointment in connection with treatment and care
required for the workplace injury;
had been required to travel some distance (out of state) to seek required care,
and was paid for the travel;
was injured while proceeding directly home from her appointment, without
evidence of diverting on an errand or any other activity unrelated to her
appointment;
was not driving negligently at the time of the accident.

19

Id. at 374, 375
20

21

22

The Hearing Examiner found that the death was compensable because the death
could be linked to the injury. Id. at 377.

23
24

25
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On appeal, the Supreme Court of Wyoming found that the "... linkage between
3

the compensable injury and the travel is direct and unbroken." Id. at 375. The Court was
4

presented with the question of the whether the heirs of the employee were entitled to
5

benefits under a Wyoming statute which mandated death benefits "if an injured
6

employee dies as a result of a work related injury ... [.]" Id.
7

The Court found that the death statute at issue provided broader protections than
8

other workplace injuries not resulting death. The Court wrote "... the language 'as a
9

result of' is broader than the concept of 'proximate cause[.]' The Legislature chose this
10

language for a reason, and that reason must be because death benefits were not
11

intended to be restricted only to families of those whose deaths were immediately,
12

solely, primarily, or proximately caused by industrial accidents." Id. at 376.
13
14

15
16

17
18
19
20
21

22

23

Even with broader protections, the court reversed the hearing examiner, finding
that in order for death to be compensable, the initial injury must be the direct cause of
the employee's death. Id. at 377. The court's reasoning is particularly instructive here,
and therefore will be quoted at length:
As the division points out, it would be impossible to ever cut off
compensability if we were to adopt the hearing examiner's interpretation of
the causation requirement. Would we compensate an employee who
wrecked her car and died because she fell asleep at the wheel while she
was on her way to see her doctor? Would we compensate an employee
who was killed by a drunk driver while she was on her way home from her
doctor's appointment? A logical end would not exist to the causation test
which the hearing examiner proposes. Furthermore, it would lead to too
many abuses, and the worker's compensation fund would, in effect,
become a general health and accident insurance fund, a purpose for
which it was not intended.

24

25
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7
8

A causal connection does not exist between the employee's initial injury
and her car accident. The fact that she was returning from a doctor's
appointment for an injury which she sustained while she was
working ... does not translate to a finding that the injury caused her death.
Certainly, the accident which caused the employee's death did not occur
because of her work related back injury. The accident was not a hazard of
her employment that she would not have been subjected to apart from her
job nor did it result from a risk reasonably incident to the character of the
business. Rather, the accident resulted from a hazard that we are all
equally exposed to - bad road conditions.
Id. at 377-378
(emphasis added)

9

Likewise, in Carlson v. Young, 171 NE2d 736 (Ohio 1959), the employee was
10

required to submit to a medical examination, and while in route was injured in a bus
11

accident. In affirming the lower court's denial of benefits due to injuries caused by the
12

bus accident, the Court of Appeals of Ohio stated:
13

14

15
16

17
18
19
20

If the intervening cause was wholly responsible for the final result, then no
liability attaches to the previous injury. To create liability, the disability
suffered must be the consequence of a continuous chain of causation so
connected that the act or force complained of is carried through from the
employment to the accident to the injury and to the disability. If an
intervening independent agency breaks the chain of causation so as to
destroy the original force, the employer is relieved from injuries following
· the termination of the force which the employment set in motion.
Id. at 738-739
(quoting from Scheider on Workmen's Compensation, v. 6, § 1543(f), p.
53)
(Also see Rucker v. Michigan Smelting & Refining Co., 300 Mich. 668, 2 NW2d

21

808 (1942); and Dean v. Chrysler Corp., 434 Mich. 655, 455 NW2d 699 (1990).
22
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CONCLUSION

Claimant's motor vehicle collision was an intervening, independent, responsible,
and culminating cause and therefore the proximate cause of the injuries resulting from
the collision. Therefore, claimant must be denied benefits associated with those injuries.
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7

/

I

fVt/tv~

8

WYN/JMOS~N
I

I

9
10

11

12

13
14

15

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
day of May, 2014, a true and correct copy of the
I hereby certify that on this
foregoing document was served upon the following individual by regular US mail:.
Michael Kessinger
Attorney at Law
PO Box 287
Lewiston, ID 83501

17
18

19
20

21

22

23
24

25

DEFENDANT'S RESPONSIVE BRIEF - 6

(@
MOSMAN
LAW OFFICES

Michael T. Kessinger, Esq. - ISBA No. 6719
GOICOECHEA LAW OFFICES, LLP
826 Main Street
PO Box 287
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BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

BARBARA KELLY,
IC No.: 13-024694
Claimant,
CLAIMANT'S REPLY BRIEF

V.

BLUE RIBBON LINEN SUPPLY, INC.,
Employer,
and
IDAHO STATE INSURANCE FUND,
Surety,
Defendants.

1. Defendants ignore the Compensable Consequence Doctrine.

The Idaho Industrial Commission has consistently applied the compensable
consequence doctrine to workers' compensation claims for approximately 25 years.
Despite the well-established precedent, and despite the direct application of the
doctrine, as set forth by Professor Larson, to the facts at issue in this case, Defendants
do not address the doctrine in their brief. The doctrine dictates that Claimant's injuries
CLAIMANT'S REPLY BRIEF

1

sustained in the motor vehicle collision are a compensable consequence of her primary
industrial injury.

2. The minority view put forth by Defendants is not persuasive.
As set forth in Claimant's Opening Brief, an overwhelming majority of states that
have addressed the issue currently before the Commission have concluded that injuries
sustained in a motor vehicle collision while traveling to or from a medical appointment
necessitated by a compensable industrial injury are a compensable consequence of the
primary industrial injury. Defendants argue that the Commission should adopt the
minority position. Defendants cite cases from two other jurisdictions to support their
contention that Claimant's injuries from the subject collision are not compensable.
First, Defendants cite the Wyoming case of Wyoming Workers' Safety and
Compensation Division v. Bruhn, 951 P.2d 372 (Wyo.1997). Unlike Idaho, Wyoming has
not adopted the compensable consequence doctrine. Instead, Wyoming has adopted
the "second compensable injury rule", which applies "when an initial compensable injury
ripens into a condition requiring additional medical intervention." Yenne-Tulley v.
Workers' Safety & Comp. Div., 12 P.3d 170, 172 (Wyo. 2000). Thus, Bruhn is neither
persuasive nor instructive in the case before the Commission.
In addition to the Wyoming case, Defendants cite an Ohio Court of Appeals
decision from 1959 and Michigan decisions form 1942 and 1990. Like Wyoming, and
unlike Idaho, it appears that neither Michigan nor Ohio have adopted the compensable
consequence doctrine as defined by Professor Larson.
The authority provided by Defendants from other jurisdictions is unpersuasive.
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GOICOECHEA LAW OFFICES, LLP

Michael Kessinger
Attorney for Claimant

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
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BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

BARBARA KELLY,
Claimant,

IC 2013-024694

V.

BLUE RIBBON LINEN SUPPLY, INC.,

FINDINGS OF FACT,
CONCLUSION OF LAW,
ORDERAND
DISSENTING OPINION

Employer,
and
IDAHO STATE INSURANCE FUND,
Surety,
Defendants.
INTRODUCTION

Pursuant to Idaho Code § 72-506, the Idaho Industrial Commission assigned the
above-entitled matter to Referee Michael Powers. In lieu of a hearing, the parties submitted the
issue for resolution on a Stipulation of Facts and briefing. Michael Kessinger of Lewiston
represented Claimant, and Wynn Mosman of Moscow represented Defendants. The matter came
under advisement on May 29, 2014. The undersigned Commissioners have chosen not to adopt
the Referee's recommendation and hereby issue their own findings of fact, conclusions of law
and order.
ISSUE

The sole issue to be decided is whether Claimant is entitled to applicable workers'
compensation benefits for injuries suffered in an automobile accident while returning from an
IME scheduled by Surety related to Claimant's ongoing workers' compensation claim.
SYNOPSIS OF CASE AND CONTENTIONS OF THE PARTIES

On September 16, 2013, Claimant suffered a covered industrial accident while working
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for Employer. Pursuant to the ensuing workers' compensation claim, Surety ordered Claimant to
attend an IME in Post Falls, Idaho on November 15, 2013. On her return trip home to Lewiston
from the IME, Claimant was involved in an automobile accident, which resulted in further
mJunes.
The parties dispute whether Claimant's injuries sustained in the auto accident would be
subject to workers' compensation benefits. Claimant argues under the theory of "compensable
consequences" the injuries would be covered.

Defendants argue the accident was an

"intervening, independent, responsible, and culminating cause" and therefore not subject to
workers' compensation coverage.
RECORD FOR REVIEW
The record in this matter consists of the Stipulation of Facts and legal briefing submitted
by the parties.
STIPULATED FACTS
The undisputed and stipulated facts are set forth below verbatim from the parties'
Stipulation of Facts.

I.

On September 16, 2013, Claimant Barbara Kelly (hereafter Claimant) was an

employee of Blue Ribbon Linen Supply, Inc. (hereafter Blue Ribbon), in Lewiston, Idaho. At
said time, Blue Ribbon was insured for its obligations under the Idaho Workers' Compensation
Act by the Idaho State Insurance Fund (hereafter Surety).
2.

On or about September 16, 2013, Claimant, Employer, and Surety were subject to

the provisions ofidaho's Worker's Compensation Law.
3.

Claimant suffered a compensable workers' compensation injury when a cart rolled

over her left foot while in the course and scope of her employment with Blue Ribbon on
September 16, 2013.
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4.

Surety paid medical and time loss benefits to Claimant as a result of the injury to

her left foot.
5.

On or about November 8, 2013, Julie Estes, an agent of Surety, sent Claimant

a letter, which read as follows:
We [Surety] have arranged for you to be seen in an independent
medical evaluation with Robert Friedman. This appointment is scheduled for
November 15, 2013, at 1:00 p.m. and will be held at Kootenai Health Plaza,
which is located at 1300 East Mullan Avenue, Post Falls, Idaho.
Please make the necessary arrangements to keep this appointment and bring
copies of all x-rays/MRI films with you. Failure to do so may result in the
termination of benefits and the responsibility for any "no show" charges.
You may submit a report of all travel expenses to this office for reimbursement.
This should include the date traveled, destination, and round trip mileage.
6.

It is approximately 125 miles each way from Claimant's workplace in Lewiston,

Idaho, to Post Falls, Idaho.
7.

Dr. Robert Friedman performs medical evaluations in Lewiston, Idaho.

Appointments with Dr. Friedman were available in November in Post Falls and in December in
Lewiston. Claimant was scheduled for the November appointment in Post Falls.
8.

On November 15, 2013, Claimant traveled to Post Falls, Idaho, for the surety-

scheduled medical evaluation. On said date she was still an employee of Blue Ribbon and was
receiving time loss benefits from Surety.
9.

Directly after meeting with Dr. Friedman, Claimant began her return trip from

Post Falls, Idaho, to Lewiston.
10.

Claimant did not make any stops or take any detours on her way home from the

appointment with Dr. Friedman.
11.

At 3:50 p.m. on November 15, 2013, on US 95 approximately five miles south of
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Potlatch, it was snowing and the road was covered with snow. At said location, Claimant was
southbound in her Ford Expedition when a northbound Ford F150 lost traction, crossed the
centerline, and collided head-on with Claimant's vehicle. Claimant's actions did not cause or
contribute to the collision.
12.

As a result of the automobile collision, Claimant suffered severe physical injuries

to her lower extremities. Due to the extent of her injuries, Claimant's doctor restricted her from
any weight-bearing on her lower extremities until further notice.

As a result of the crash,

Claimant was in a skilled nursing facility in Lewiston, Idaho, until February 28, 2014.
DISCUSSION AND FURTHER FINDINGS

13.

The provisions of the Idaho Workers' Compensation Law are to be liberally

construed in favor of the employee. Haldiman v. American Fine Foods, 117 Idaho 955, 956, 793
P.2d 187, 188 (1990). The humane purposes which it serves leave no room for narrow, technical
construction. Ogden v. Thompson, 128 Idaho 87, 88, 910 P.2d 759, 760 (1996).
14.

Pursuant to Idaho Code§ 72-102(18)(a) a claimant must prove not only that she

was injured, but also that the injury was caused by an accident "arising out of and in the course
of' her employment. In Idaho, the seminal case treating what it is an injured worker must prove
in this regard is Eriksen v. Nez Perce County, 72 Idaho 1, 235 P.2d 736 (1951). Although the
Idaho rule did not originate in Eriksen, the rule is given its most lucid expression in that case.
Quoting from the Oregon case of Larsen v. State Industrial Accident Commission, 135 Or. 137,
295 P. 195 (1931 ), the Eriksen court explained what it means for an accident to arise out of and
occur in the course of employment:
It is sufficient to say that an injury is received 'in the course of the employment
when it comes while the workman is doing the duty which he is employed to
perform. It arises 'out of the employment, when there is apparent to the rational
mind upon consideration of all the circumstances, a causal connection between
the conditions under which the work is required to be performed and the resulting
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mJury. Under this test, if the injury can be seen to have followed as a natural
incident of the work and to have been contemplated by a reasonable person
familiar with the whole situation as a result of the exposure occasioned by the
nature of the employment, then it arises 'out o:f the employment. But it excludes
an injury which cannot fairly be traced to the employment as a contributing
proximate cause and which comes from a hazard to which the workmen would
have been equally exposed apart from the employment. The causative danger
must be peculiar to the work and not common to the neighborhood. It must be
incidental to the character of the business and not independent of the relation of
master and servant. It need not have been foreseen or expected, but after the
event it must appear to have had its origin in a risk connected with the
employment, and to have flowed from that source as a rational consequence.

Eriksen v. Nez Perce County, 72 Idaho at 6 (1951).

This explanation has been cited with

approval in almost every subsequent Idaho case in which "arising" and "course" issues are
discussed. See Colson v. Steele, 73 Idaho 348, 252 P.2d 1049 (1953); Kiger v. Idaho

Corporation, 85 Idaho 424, 380 P.2d 208 (1963); Wilder v. Redd, 111 Idaho 141, 721 P.2d 1240
(1986); O'Loughlin v. Circle A Construction, 112 Idaho 1048, 739 P.2d 347 (1987); Evans v.

Hara's, Inc., 123 Idaho 473, 849 P.2d 934 (1993); Kessler on behalf of Kessler v. Payette
County, 129 Idaho 855, 934 P.2d 28 (1997); Dinius v. Loving Care and More, Inc., 133 Idaho
572, 990 P.2d 738 (1999); Jensen v. City of Pocatello, 135 Idaho 406, 18 P.3d 211 (2000).
However, that portion of the Eriksen rule which excludes from coverage injuries caused by
exposure to a risk to which the workman would have been equally exposed apart from
employment has been implicitly, if not explicitly, ovenuled by Spivey v. Novartis Seed, Inc., 137
Idaho 29, 43 P.3d 788 (2002), and Vawter v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 155 Idaho 903, 318
P.3d 893 (2014). In Spivey, the claimant suffered a shoulder injury as the result ofreaching over
a conveyor belt to remove a small pebble.

Defendants urged the Court to apply the rule

explained in Eriksen, and so conclude that Spivey could not prevail where it was shown that her
employment subjected her to the same risk of injury to which she was exposed apart from her
employment.

Defendants argued that in order to prevail Spivey must demonstrate that her
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employment exposed her to a risk of injury that was greater than the risk to which she was
exposed apart from her employment. The Court rejected this argument, concluding that Idaho
law no longer supports the proposition that a claimant must demonstrate that her employment
subjects her to a "greater risk" of injury before she can recover benefits. After Spivey, supra, it
seems clear that where the risk of injury is one to which the claimant is equally exposed both
within and without the workplace, this will not be an impediment to compensability, as might be
suggested by the Eriksen rule. However, Spivey does nothing to denigrate the long followed rule
that for an injury to be compensable a sufficiently strong causal connection must exist between
the employment and the injury that a reasonable person would conclude that employer should
bear responsibility for the injury.
15.

The question presented by the facts before us is whether the injuries Claimant

suffered as a consequence of the motor vehicle accident of November 15, 2013, can be said to
arise out of, and occur in the course of her employment.

The only connection between

Claimant's employment and the injuries in question is the fact that Claimant was returning home
following an Idaho Code§ 72-433 medical exam at the time the motor vehicle accident occurred.
Idaho Code§ 72-433 provides in pertinent part:
After an injury or contraction of an occupational disease and during the period of
disability the employee, if requested by the employer or ordered by the
commission, shall submit himself for examination at reasonable times and places
to a duly qualified physician or surgeon. The employee shall be reimbursed for
his expenses of necessary travel and subsistence in submitting himself for any
such examination and for loss of wages, if any. For purposes of this section, the
reimbursement for loss of wages shall be at the employee's then current rate of
pay if the employee is then working; otherwise, such reimbursement shall be at
the total temporary disability rate. Reimbursement for travel expenses, if the
employee utilizes a private vehicle, shall be at the mileage rate allowed by the
state board of examiners for state employees; provided, however, that the
employee shall not be reimbursed for the first fifteen (15) miles of any round trip,
nor for traveling any round trip distance of fifteen (15) miles or less. Such
distance shall be calculated by the shortest practical route of travel.
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Therefore, if requested by the employer, the injured worker shall submit to such examination.
16.

An injured worker who fails to comply with the employer's request for a medical

examination faces curtailment of benefits and suspension of workers' compensation proceedings
as specified by Idaho Code§ 72-434. That section provides:
If an injured employee unreasonably fails to submit to or in any way obstructs an
examination by a physician or surgeon designated by the commission or the
employer, the injured employee's right to take or prosecute any proceedings under
this law shall be suspended until such failure or obstruction ceases, and no
compensation shall be payable for the period during which such failure or
obstruction continues.
17.

The injuries for which Claimant seeks benefits are not those directly caused by

the admittedly compensable accident of September 16, 2013. Rather, the injuries for which
Claim~nt seeks benefits are, at most, a remote consequence of the original work injury. Claimant
contends, however, that because she was required by statute to attend the Idaho Code § 72-433
exam, the injuries she sustained as a consequence of the motor vehicle accident are a
compensable, albeit remote, consequence of the original work injury.
18.

As the parties have discovered, there is an Idaho case very nearly on point to the

instant matter, Kiger v. The Idaho Corporation, 85 Idaho 424, 380 P.2d 208 (1963). Before
discussing Kiger, however, it is helpful to review several of the cases cited in Kiger, and upon
which the Kiger court relied in reaching its decision.
19.

In Farmers' Gin Co. et al. v. Cooper et al., 147 Okl. 29,294 P. 108 (1930), the

claimant suffered an injury to his eye while working on a cotton gin. A little less than a month
later, claimant was returning from receiving medical treatment for his eye injury when he was
involved in a motor vehicle accident as a result of which he sustained a fractured patella. The
Oklahoma Industrial Commission determined that claimant's eye injury was one arising out of
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and in the course of his employment and that the patellar injury, too, was compensable, because
it resulted from the eye injury. Applying a rule defining what it means for an injury to both arise
out of and be in the course of employment very similar to the Eriksen rule, the Farmers' Gin
Company Court rejected the notion that the knee injury could be said to be an injury arising out

of and in the course of employment. In so doing, the Court recognized that claimant's invitation
to find the knee injury compensable was, at its heart, an invitation to adopt a "but for" test of
causation:
Did the last accident arise "out of' the employment? We hold it did not, for it
was not the result of the exposure occasioned by the nature of the employment,
but, on the other hand, it was the result of a condition common to the
neighborhood - an ordinary automobile accident. It may just as well have been a
bolt of lightening. It was not incidental to the character of the business in which
claimant was employed. The highway collision was the proximate cause of the
accident; it was an intervening cause. Southern Surety Co. v. Galloway, 89 Okl.
45, 213 P. 850. Consequently we can and do say, without hesitation, that the last
injury did not arise out of the employment. The latter injury is no more the result
of the former accident than it was the result of claimant's having been born. It is
equally clear that but for either event claimant would not have been where he was
when last stuck, but such is not the test. The decisive fact is that the latter
accident was in no sense due to the employment, nor did it result from a risk
reasonably incident to the employment and there is a severance rather than a
causal connection between the conditions under which the work was required to
be performed and the resulting injury.
Farmers' Gin Co. et al. v. Cooper et al., 292 P. at 110 (1930).

20.

In Linder v. City of Payette, 64 Idaho 656, 135 P.2d 440 (1943) Decedent suffered

an original work-related injury to his left arm in March of 1941. As a result of this injury, he
was placed in a plaster cast extending from the shoulder to the fingers, holding the elbow rigid
and the forearm at a right angle to the upper arm. While being so treated, Decedent and a
companion went fishing from a small boat at Sage Hen Reservoir. In the course of their outing,
the boat capsized and Decedent drowned.

Decedent's survivors contended that they were

entitled to death benefits on the theory that the original accident was the proximate cause of
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Decedent's death because the cast on Decedent's arm hindered him in his ability to swim or
otherwise save himself after being thrown into the water. As to Claimant's speculation in this
regard, the Court noted that there was no proof on the exact cause of Decedent's death.
21.

On the question of whether or not the boating accident constituted an intervening

cause breaking the chain of causation between the original work accident and Decedent's death,
the Court stated:
We accept as correct appellant's proposition of law that the definition and
determination of "proximate cause" in the field of torts is applicable herein. A
recognized concomitant is that if there occurs, after the initial accident and injury,
an intervening, independent, responsible, and culminating cause, the latter
occurrence becomes the proximate cause.
'The proximate cause of an event must be understood to be that which in a natural
and continuous sequence, unbroken by a new cause, produces that event and
without which that event would not have occurred.' [Emphasis added.] (Pilmer
v. Boise Traction Co., Ltd., 14 Ida. 327, at 341, 94 P. 432.)
The law regards the one as the proximate cause of the other, without regard to the
lapse of time where no other cause intervenes or comes between the negligence
[initial injury] charged and the injuries received to contribute to it. There must be
nothing to break the causal connection between the alleged negligence [first
accident and injury] and the injuries [death].' [Emphasis added.] (Antler v. Cox,
27 Ida. 517, at 527, 149 P. 731.)
It must be clearly kept in mind that the essential causal connection which must not
be broken is, not that between the concededly compensable accident and the
direct injury therefrom (Brink v. H Earl Clack Co., 60 Ida.730, 96 P.(2d) 500),
but between the initial accident and injury and a subsequent and otherwise
disconnected injury having no relationship whatever to decedent's employment.

Linder v. City ofPayette, 64 Idaho at 658-59 (1943).
The Court concluded that the facts of the case were sufficient to support the conclusion of the
Industrial Accident Board that the boating accident constituted an intervening cause which broke
the causal connection between the original work accident and Decedent's death.
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22.

In Kiger v. The Idaho Corp., supra, the claimant was injured on September 16,

1960 when she slipped and fell at her place of employment while carrying flats of eggs. Kiger
suffered injuries to her right lower back as a result of the accident. Following the accident she
began to treat with Dr. Hawkins. On October 10, 1960, while driving to Dr. Hawkins' office for
treatment, Claimant was involved in an automobile accident which caused severe neck and
shoulder injuries. The Industrial Accident Board found that the injuries claimant sustained as the
result of the automobile accident did not arise out of and in the course of claimant's employment
and were therefore not compensable, notwithstanding the fact that the injury would not have
occurred if claimant had not been seeking treatment for the injuries associated with the original
accident.
23.

On appeal, the Court stated that in order to determine whether or not the injuries

caused by the automobile accident are compensable, it must be determined whether that injury
was one arising out of and in the course of claimant's employment. In discussing the "arising"
and "course" requirements, the Court quoted extensively from the Eriksen rule discussed above.
The Court noted that the only connection between claimant's employment and the injuries she
received as a result of the motor vehicle accident was the fact that she was on her way to receive
treatment for her admittedly work-related low back injury at the time the motor vehicle accident
occurred. Citing the reasoning of the court in Farmers' Gin Co. v. Cooper, with approval, the

Linder court ruled that the motor vehicle accident at issue was not due to claimant's
employment, and did not result from a risk reasonably incident to her employment. Rather, the
motor vehicle accident constituted an intervening cause which broke the chain of causation
between the original work accident and the injuries claimant received as a result of the motor
vehicle accident. Thus, even though the motor vehicle accident would not have occurred "but
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for" the fact that claimant originally suffered a slip and fall injury at work, employer cannot be
held responsible for the consequences of the motor vehicle accident because legal or proximate
cause cannot be established.
24.

We believe that Kiger is controlling, and the automobile accident in this case, as

with the automobile accident at issue in Kiger, constitutes an intervening cause breaking the
chain of causation between Claimant's employment and the motor vehicle accident. Of course, it
is not lost on us that the facts of this case are slightly different than those before the court in
Kiger. In Kiger claimant was on her way to receiving medical treatment at the time of the motor

vehicle accident, whereas Ms. Kelly was on her way home after attending a surety-required
Idaho Code§ 72-433 exam. Had she refused to attend this exam, or had she otherwise frustrated
the purposes of surety to obtain such an exam, she could have faced curtailment of workers
compensation benefits and the suspension of proceedings before the Commission. It is argued
that these facts warrant a different result than that which obtained in Kiger. However, we fail to
see why this distinction should result in a different outcome, tempting though it may be. After
all, rather than arrange an Idaho Code § 72-433 exam at a time and place more convenient to
Claimant, surety arranged for an exam far removed from Claimant's residence, at a time of year
that would expose her to dangerous conditions while traveling. While Claimant could have
petitioned the Industrial Commission for relief from the scheduled exam, and therefore cannot
be said to have been without recourse, she failed, for whatever reason, to pursue this, and so
suffered the injuries that she assuredly would not have suffered "but for" the Idaho Code
§ 72-433 exam. In this case, as in Kiger, a causal connection does exist between the original

work-related injury and the motor vehicle accident because the motor vehicle accident would not
have happened but for the original work-related injury. However, like Kiger, Claimant's injuries
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were caused by the actions of a negligent third party which severed that causal connection, even
if one accepts the proposition that the causal connection was stronger under the facts of this case.
The intervening cause is the true proximate cause of Claimant's injuries, not her employment or
the subject accident.

CONCLUSION OF LAW AND ORDER
1.

Claimant is not entitled to Workers' Compensation benefits for the injuries that

she suffered as the result of the November 15, 2013 motor vehicle accident.
2.

Pursuant to Idaho Code § 72- 718, this decision is final and conclusive as to all

matters adjudicated.
Dated this~'--day o f ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ - - - - ' 2014.
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION

ATTEST:
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COMMISSIONER R.D. MAYNARD DISSENTING:

After reviewing the record and controlling Idaho case law on the matter, I respectfully
dissent from the analysis and conclusions of the majority.
The majority begins its analysis by acknowledging Idaho precedent regarding whether an
injury caused by an accident arose out of and in the course of employment, citing Ericksen v. Nez

Perce County, 72 Idaho 1, 235 P.2d 736 (1951). The majority then discusses Spivey v. Novartis
Seed Inc., 137 Idaho 29, 43 P.3d 788 (2002) and goes a step further by "concluding that Idaho
law no longer supports the proposition that a claimant must demonstrate that her employment
subjects her to a 'greater risk' of injury before she can recover benefits." Majority Decision

,r 14.
The majority concedes a connection between Claimant's employment and the injuries in
question because Claimant was returning home following a mandatory medical exam, pursuant
to Idaho Code § 72-433, at the time the motor vehicle accident (MVA) occurred. My colleagues
further concede that an injured worker who fails to comply with an employer's request for an
independent medical exam (IME) risks curtailment of benefits and suspension of workers'
compensation proceedings. Idaho Code § 72-434. The law requires, and the stipulated facts
reflect, that Claimant would be reimbursed for her travel expenses. Idaho Code § 72-433(1) also
requires reimbursement for any loss of wages incurred while submitting to an IME. Having cited
Idaho law and undisputed facts that would support compensation of Claimant's MVA injuries,
the majority then goes outside Idaho law in an attempt to justify its denial of benefits.
After reviewing what it considers to be compelling case law, the majority ultimately
returns to an Idaho case that it characterizes as "very nearly on point to the instant matter."
Majority Decision

,r

18; Kiger v. Idaho Corporation, 85 Idaho 424, 380 P.2d 208 (1963). In
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comparing the facts of Kiger with the facts of this case, the majority grapples with "whether
there is a distinction [between Kiger's non-compensable subsequent accident and Claimant's
subsequent accident] that will bear close scrutiny." Majority Decision 1 34. The majority finds
in the negative. My colleagues note that the Kiger Court "quoted extensively from the Ericksen
rule." Majority Decision

~

23. The citation by the Kiger Court to the Ericksen decision is as

follows:
It is sufficient to say that an injury is received 'in the course of the employment
when it comes while the workman is doing the duty which he is employed to
perform. It arises 'out of the employment, when there is apparent to the rational
mind upon consideration of all the circumstances, a causal connection between
the conditions under which the work is required to be performed and the resulting
injury. Under this test, if the injury can be seen to have followed as a natural
incident of the work and to have been contemplated by a reasonable person
familiar with the whole situation as a result of the exposure occasioned by the
nature of the employment, then it arises 'out of the employment. But it excludes
an injury which cannot be fairly traced to the employment as a contributing
proximate cause and which comes from a hazard to which the workmen would
have been equally exposed apart from the employment.

Kiger, 85 Idaho at 430, 380 P.2d at 210-211. It is puzzling, at best, to understand how the

majority could rely on a 51-year-old case that quotes extensively from a portion of another case
that the majority admits "has been implicitly, if not explicitly, overruled" recently by Spivey in
2002. Majority Decision 1 14.
Even assuming, arguendo, that the findings in Kiger are still good law, there is an
obvious distinction between a required IME and an appointment for treatment of a compensable
injury. Kiger was injured while traveling to a routine medical appointment made necessary as a
result of her work-related injury.

Claimant was injured while traveling home from an

employer-compelled IME. An IME is not medical care provided as a result of a work-related
injury; an IME is an exam conducted for Employer/Surety's benefit to assess a claimant's
condition. As previously stated, a claimant must submit to an employers request for an IME or
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risk having her workers' compensation benefits terminated. Idaho Code § 72-433 requires that
the claimant be reimbursed for any expenses, including loss of wages, incurred as a result of
submitting to the IME. It defies logic, then, to find that a compulsory directive given by an
Employer/Surety for which the employee receives reimbursement for expenses, including wages,
is outside the course and scope of the employee's scope of employment. Idaho case law is clear
that "[c]ompensation is allowable when the injury arises out of the nature of the employment,
conditions, obligations, or incidents of the employment." Smith v. University of Idaho, 67 Idaho
22, 28, 170 P.2d 404,408 (1946) (emphasis added).
The majority characterizes Claimant's MVA as a "remote consequence of the original
work injury." Majority Decision ,r 17. Attending an IME may not have been within Claimant's
original job description when she was hired by Employer, but Claimant's directive to attend
upon threat of losing her benefits certainly creates a sufficient nexus to find a requisite causal
connection between Claimant's original compensable injury and her subsequent MVA. Whether
it is the employer's directive or the employment itself that causes a claimant's injury, the injury
necessarily arises out of and in the course of employment.
Claimant, in the discharge of a duty owed to her Employer/Surety, attended a mandatory
IME - not a medical appointment for treatment of her injuries. Pursuant to Idaho Code, she was
entitled to financial reimbursement for travel expenses incurred by attending the exam. The
stipulated facts reflect that Claimant did not stop or make any detours while attending the
scheduled IME. Further, Claimant's actions did not cause nor contribute to the collision that
caused her later injuries. There is no other reasonable conclusion but that Claimant's injuries
were directly and proximately caused by the circumstances that arose out of and in the course of
her employment.
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For the foregoing reasons, I submit this dissent.
Dated this _ _£_(i,~t_h___ day of

:....:::..c__ _

_,2014.

INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION

ATTEST:

Assistant Cotim}:i,1

- ....

-

1r •

~

"'.'-,, J\., •••••••••••

,,,,,:/ 1'E OF \\)
11
1
' ••uu•'''

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the
£,f.ttS-.
day of
~ ~ ' . 1 __ ____, 2014, a true
and correct copy of the foregoing FINDINGS OF FAC , CONCLUSIONS OF LAW,
ORDER AND DISSENTING OPINION was served by regular United States Mail upon each
of the following:
MICHAEL T KESSINGER
POBOX287
LEWISTON ID 83501
WYNN MOSMAN
PO BOX 8456
MOSCOW ID 83843-8456
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Michael T. Kessinger, ISB# 6719
GOICOECHEA LAW OFFICES, LLP
826 Main Street
PO Box 287
Lewiston, Idaho 83501
Telephone: (208) 743-2313
Facsimile: (208) 743-8140

Attorneys for the Claimant/Appellant

BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

BARBARA KELLY,
IC No.: 2013-024694
Claimant/Appellant,
NOTICE OF APPEAL

V.

BLUE RIBBON LINEN SUPPLY, INC.,
Employer/Respondent,
and
IDAHO STATE INSURANCE FUND,
Surety/Respondent.

TO:

THE ABOVE-NAMED RESPONDENTS, Blue Ribbon Linen Supply, Inc., and
Idaho State Insurance Fund, by and through their attorney ofrecord, Wynn
Mosman, PO Box 8456, Moscow, Idaho, AND THE CLERK OF THE STATE
OF IDAHO INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION.

NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT:
1. The above-named Appellant, Barbara Kelly, appeals against the above-named
Respondents to the Idaho Supreme Court from the Industrial Commission's Findings of Fact and
Conclusion of Law, Order and Dissenting Opinion entered in the above-entitled proceeding on
September 26, 2014, Chairman Thomas P. Baskin presiding.
NOTICE OF APPEAL

1

2. Appellant has a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and the Order described
above is an appealable order pursuant to Rule 11 (d) I.A.R.
3. The issue on appeal is whether the Industrial Commission erred in concluding that
Appellant was not entitled to applicable workers' compensation benefits for injuries suffered in
an automobile collision while returning from a Respondent-mandated medical examination
related to Appellant's workers' compensation claim.
4. There is no hearing transcript in the above-entitled matter, as the parties stipulated to the
facts of the case.
5. The Appellant requests that the following documents be included in the agency's record
in addition to those automatically included under Rule 28 I.A.R.:
a. All briefs filed by the parties; and
b. The Parties' Stipulation of Facts.
6. The undersigned certifies that:
a. The Industrial Commission has been paid the estimated fee of $100.00 for
preparation of the agency record, pending computation of the actual fee;
b. The appellate filing fee of $94.00 is being paid herewith; and
c. Service has been made upon all parties required to be served pursuant to Rule 20
I.A.R.
DATEDthis ~
2 -GOICOECHEA LAW OFFICES, LLP

Michael Kessinger
Attorney for Claimant

NOTICE OF APPEAL
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

served a true and correct copy of the foregoing document was served on the following parties via
US Mail:
Wynn Mosman
PO Box 8456
Moscow, ID 83843
FAX: 208.882.0589

Michael Kessinger

NOTICE OF APPEAL
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BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
BARBARA KELLY,
Claimant/Appellant,

SUPREME COURT NO.
CERTIFICATE OF APPEAL

V.

BLUE RIBBON LINEN SUPPLY, INC.,
Employer, and IDAHO STATE INSURANCE
FUND, Surety,
Defendants/Respondents

Appeal From:

Industrial Commission,
Thomas P. Baskin, Chairman presiding

Case Number:

IC 2013-024694

Order Appealed from:

Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, Order and
Dissenting Opinion, filed September 26, 2014.

Attorney for Appellant:

Michael T. Kessinger
PO Box 287
Lewiston, ID 83501

Attorney for Respondents:

Wynn Mosman
PO Box 8456
Moscow, ID 83843-8456

Appealed By:

Claimant/Appellant, Barbara Kelly

Appealed Against: ·

Defendants/Respondents, Blue Ribbon Linen
Supply, Inc. and Idaho State Insurance Fund

Notice of Appeal Filed:

October 30, 2014

Appellate Fee Paid:

$94.00 to Supreme Court and
$100.00 to Industrial Commission
Checks were received.

Name of Reporter:

No hearing was held.

CERTIFICATE OF APPEAL FOR BARBARA KELLY - 1
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Transcript Requested:

No hearing was held. The decision was based upon
a stipulation of facts.

Dated:

October 30, 2014

Assistant Commission Secretary

CERTIFICATE OF APPEAL FOR BARBARA KELLY - 2

CERTIFICATION OF APPEAL

I, Kenna Andrus, the undersigned Assistant Commission Secretary of the Industrial
Commission of the State of Idaho, hereby CERTIFY that the foregoing is a true and correct
photocopy of the Notice of Appeal; Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, Order and
Dissenting Opinion, and the whole thereof, in IC case number 2013-024694 for Barbara Kelly
vs. Blue Ribbon Linen Supply, Inc., Employer, and Idaho State Insurance Fund, Surety.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the official seal of
said Commission this 30th day of October, 2014.

CERTIFICATION OF APPEAL-Barbara Kelly-1

CERTIFICATION OF RECORD

I, Kenna Andrus, the undersigned Assistant Commission Secretary of the Industrial
Commission, do hereby certify that the foregoing record contains true and correct copies of all
pleadings, documents, and papers designated to be included in the Agency's Record Supreme Court
No. 42658 on appeal by Rule 28(b)(3) of the Idaho Appellate Rules and by the Notice of Appeal,
pursuant to the provisions of Rule 28(b).
I further certify that all exhibits offered or admitted in this proceeding, if any, are correctly
listed in the List of Exhibits. Said exhibits will be lodged with the Supreme Court upon settlement
of the Reporter's Transcript and Agency's Record herein.
DATEDthisj(c{ day of

a~ ,

2014.

CERTIFICATION OF RECORD (BARBARA KELLY - 42658) - 1

BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

BARBARA KELLY,
Claimant/Appellant,

SUPREME COURT NO. 42658
NOTICE OF COMPLETION

V.

BLUE RIBBON LINEN SUPPLY, INC.,
Employer, and IDAHO STATE INSURANCE
FUND, Surety,
Defendants/Respondents.

TO:

STEPHEN W. KENYON, Clerk of the Courts; and
Michael T. Kessinger for the Appellants; and
Wynn Mosman for the Respondent.
YOU ARE HEREBY NOTIFIED that the Clerk's Record was completed on this date and,

pursuant to Rule 24(a) and Rule 27(a), Idaho Appellate Rules, copies of the same have been
served by regular U.S. mail upon each of the following:
Attorney for Appellant:
MICHAEL T KESSINGER
POBOX287
LEWISTON ID 83501
Attorney for Respondent(s):
WYNN MOSMAN
PO BOX 8456
MOSCOW ID 83843

YOU ARE FURTHER NOTIFIED that pursuant to Rule 29(a), Idaho Appellate Rules, all
parties have twenty-eight days from the date of this Notice in which to file objections to the
Clerk's Record, including requests for corrections, additions or deletions.
NOTICE OF COMPLETION (BARBARA KELLY - 42658) - 1

In the event no

objections to the Clerk's Record or Reporter's Transcript are filed within the twenty-eight day
period, the Clerk's Record and Reporter's Transcript shall be deemed settled.
DATED at Boise, Idaho, this ~_day of_Jj_~~~!'____, 2014.

Assistant Commission Secretary

NOTICE OF COMPLETION (BARBARA KELLY - 42658) - 2

